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R

apid technological progress in man
ufacturing has led to higher wages and
rising standards of living for over two
centuries, but in the last 50 years it has
also reduced the need for manufacturing
labor. The primary source of American
prosperity is no longer manufacturing;
ours is now an increasingly serviceoriented economy in which innovations
in high-tech sectors and other profes
sional services are the most important
sources of future prosperity.
The United States has the highest longterm underlying rate of economic
growth in the world. A conservative esti
mate is that the standard of living of the
average American doubles every 30
years. But an economy undergoing rapid
technological progress is one in which
some sectors are booming and others are
senescent. For example, water transport
was a primary source of prosperity for
Ohio for several generations after the
opening of the Erie Canal. The advent of
a national network of railroads at the end
of the nineteenth century signaled the
end of a way of life for many whose
livelihood depended upon inland water
transportation. But there can be no
doubt that knitting together a national
market—first by rail and then by road—
gave a tremendous boost to the eco
nomic growth that our country enjoyed
in the last century.
We are now at a similar crossroads in
economic history. Manufacturing—the
transformation of tangible substances into
more refined commodities—is no longer
a primary source of prosperity. The per
centage of people employed in manufac
turing in the United States has declined
steadily since the 1960s, from 25 percent
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then to less than 12.5 percent today. And
the United States is not the only country
to have experienced a relative decline in
manufacturing employment; the same
trend has been part of the economic his
tory of almost every advanced economy
in the last two generations.
The declining need for workers in a sector
that has traditionally provided good jobs
has naturally generated concern and calls
for appropriate public policy. Blame for
the decline is most often placed on “glob
alization” in general, or the outsourcing
of jobs to other countries in particular.
Some see the shifting of jobs from one
state to another and conclude that varia
tion in economic policies (for example,
taxes) is the problem. Deal with these
issues, people imagine, and we will be
able to preserve manufacturing jobs.
But factors such as globalization and
state policies account for only the tiniest
portion of the change. A clue to the true
source of the shift in manufacturing
employment is the fact that all developed
countries are witnessing the same trend.
What that trend tells us is that the pri
mary cause of the decline in manufactur
ing employment in advanced economies
is the inexorable march of technological
progress.
■

The New Face of
Manufacturing Employment

Figure 1 and table 1 illustrate the major
features of the employment trend we are
discussing. Figure 1 demonstrates
clearly that the relative share of manu
facturing employment has fallen steadily
and substantially in our country for at
least 50 years. Table 1 shows that the
decline in the share of workers in manu
facturing is occurring in all major
advanced economies. The table also

In the last 50 years, the share of
employment in manufacturing has
declined in the United States. The
main reason for this phenomenon is
labor-saving technological progress.
Variation among state tax polices and
international economic conditions
have played only minor roles. The
source of future prosperity will be
technological advances in a serviceoriented economy.

shows that some of the countries that
have experienced the most rapid
increases in their standards of living in
the last two decades are those whose
shares of employment in manufacturing
have dropped most substantially. There
is even some preliminary evidence that
this is true for the less developed coun
tries in the last few years (“Constraints
to Achieving Full Employment in Asia,”
by Dipak Mazumdar, International
Labor Organization, Employment and
Training Papers, no. 51, 1999, table 2).
Focusing on economic activity in manu
facturing gives a different perspective.
The data on real gross state product in
manufacturing for the last 15 years show
that economic activity in manufacturing
in the United States is not declining in
absolute terms. It is declining as a share
of the national economy, and its employ
ment share is declining because of rapid
increases in productivity among manu
facturing workers.
Industries classified by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics as manufacturing are
diverse, ranging from retail bakeries to
petrochemical refineries. They do not

include mining, construction, or trans
portation activities. It is important to
bear in mind that any category of eco
nomic statistics is to some extent arbi
trary, but it is perhaps safe to say that
manufacturing jobs have been desired in
the last two or three generations because
they paid fairly well and did not typi
cally require a college education.
But while many people still view skilled
manufacturing jobs as an abundant local
source of high-paying employment, the
connection has not held for some time.
Figure 2 gives a dramatic illustration of
the link between high real wages and the
share of employment in manufacturing.
This figure shows the relationship
between manufacturing employment
shares and real wages in each state for
the years 1960 through 2002. Each
observation is adjusted by subtracting the
state-specific average across the 43 years
in the sample. This technique makes
high-wage states and low-wage states
comparable; likewise, it allows one to
compare states dependent on manufac
turing with those that have smaller manu
facturing bases. The relationship between
wages and manufacturing jobs is perhaps
not what the average person anxious
about the changing economic landscape
would expect: High real wages are asso
ciated with lower employment shares in
manufacturing, even if one controls for
the fact that some states are more depen
dent upon manufacturing employment
than others.
■

Three Possible Causes for
the Decline

What has caused the decline in manufac
turing employment, and should anything
be done about it? To help answer this
question, we can investigate the explana
tions most frequently proffered—global
ization, variations in state policies, and
technology—and ascertain how much
each of these factors has contributed to
the loss of manufacturing jobs.
Figure 2 is strong evidence that the
United States economy has undergone a
period of impressive technological
progress in the last four decades. A
plausible explanation for the data is that
there is a distribution of skills among
manufacturing jobs. Wages are corre
lated with skill levels, and many for
merly low-skilled manufacturing jobs
are now being done abroad.

Many people argue that international
competition is an important cause of the
loss of manufacturing jobs. They main
tain that American firms are outsourcing
because foreign wages are a lot lower
than domestic wages. But the same argu
ment was also true at an earlier time for a
general decline of manufacturing jobs in
the industrial Northeast, as companies
moved operations to the South and West,
where unit costs were lower in the
middle part of the twentieth century.
There is a grain of truth to the argument
that foreign competition has eroded the
domestic manufacturing base in the
last 30 years. But an equally important
source of the loss of manufacturing jobs
for some states has likely been high local
state tax burdens that domestic manufac
turing enterprises face within the United
States. This conclusion is true whether
one focuses on the share of employment
in manufacturing or on economic activ
ity in manufacturing more generally.
To evaluate the impact that differences in
state policies have on manufacturing
employment, we will focus on one pol
icy that arguably affects businesses the
most—taxes. State-specific taxes consist
of several different dimensions: income
taxes, sales taxes, property taxes, estate
taxes, and a wide array of other taxes,
some of which fall particularly on manu
facturing enterprises.
It is difficult to come up with one number
that summarizes all of these considera
tions for each state in a given year, but
data from the Tax Foundation provide a
good benchmark. They can be used to
compare the different policies of the states
as well as their effects.1 For example, the
foundation calculated the tax burden
in Ohio in 1970 to be 7.9 percent, but
by 2003 it had risen to 10.3 percent. A
2.4 percent rise over almost a quartercentury may not seem like much, but a
comparison with other states shows in
essence that Ohio went from being a state
with a fairly modest tax burden in 1970 to
a state with a high tax burden by 2003.
One can also use data on gross state prod
uct to calculate the rate of indirect taxes
paid by manufacturing enterprises in each
state from 1986 through 2001. Indirect
business taxes include many different
items, and these rates vary from a 16-year
average of 1.6 percent for Alabama to
8.9 percent for Kentucky. The analogous
rate for Ohio is 2.6 percent.

To evaluate the effect of globalization,
we can take a look at the real exchange
rate—an economywide financial vari
able that affects every firm’s ability to
export. The real exchange rate relates
the price of exports to that of imports.
It has three parts: the price of domestic
goods, the price of foreign goods
(measured in foreign currency), and the
dollar price of foreign exchange.
It is also a simple measure of interna
tional competitiveness. If the real
exchange rate appreciates, it means that
domestic firms are losing international
competitiveness because the dollar is
strong or domestic goods are relatively
expensive. When this happens, Ameri
can firms are more likely to outsource
because sources of supply abroad are
relatively inexpensive. There is no doubt
that domestic firms have suffered a loss
in international competitiveness in the
last decade, when a broad measure
of the dollar made imports about
20 percent less expensive.
■

What the Statistical
Analysis Tells Us

Statistical analysis shows that the real
exchange rate and the local state tax
burden do have a small but statistically
significant influence on the share of
manufacturing employment. (The sta
tistical technique is called panel regres
sion. It exploits the variability across
time and states to estimate the partial
correlation between manufacturing
employment share and a proxy for tech
nological progress, taxes, and the real
exchange rate.)
Still, increases in productivity due to
technological advances have the greatest
effect by far. During the 1990s, techno
logical progress caused about a 3.3 per
cent decline in the share of manufactur
ing employment, while the large
appreciation of the dollar is associated
with 0.24 percent drop, and the mea
sured rise in Ohio’s tax burden is associ
ated with a decrease of 0.42 percent.
Technological progress is thus eight
times as important as the slow and
seemingly relentless rise in the overall
tax burden in the state. Also, the rise in
the tax burden is almost twice as impor
tant as the increase in international com
petition. State taxes and international
economic conditions have much smaller
effects than the march of technological
progress.

TABLE 1 MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT SHARES IN SOME
ADVANCED COUNTRIES (PERCENT)

United States
Canada
Australia
Japan
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Sweden
United Kingdom

1960

2002

Average annual
growth rate

26
25
26
22
28
34
24
29
32
36

13
15
12
19
21
24
23
14
17
16

2.1
1.7
1.9
2.2
1.5
1.8
1.7
1.9
1.5
2.1

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor and Penn World Table.
NOTES: The data for Australia start in 1965, and the data for France stop in 1989. The growth
rates are of chain-weighted GDP for the years 1980 through 2000 inclusive. The annual growth
rate is the rate of real economic growth compounded annually.
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What Can Be Done

For more than 200 years, it has taken
three skilled musicians about 20 min
utes to perform Beethoven’s trio for
clarinet, cello, and piano in B-flat
major (Opus 11). When this work was
written at the end of the eighteenth cen
tury, only the most privileged members
of society could afford to hear live
chamber music, but now one can buy a
ticket to hear world-class musicians for
$18, about the hourly wage of a manu
facturing job. In 1798, when
Beethoven’s trio was first performed,
the “price” of a radio that played classi
cal music was essentially infinite
because only visionaries might have
dreamed that telecommunication using
the principles of electromagnetism was
even possible. One can buy a good
radio now for less than $20.
The general rise of disposable income
in a prosperous modern economy
causes an increased demand for ser
vices such as health care, tourism, and
other leisure activities. So it should be
no surprise that a smaller share of the
workforce has been employed in manu
facturing in the last several decades.
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FIGURE 2 MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT AND REAL WAGES
(CONTROLS FOR STATE FIXED EFFECTS)
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It is probably not desirable to interfere
with the general forces that give rise to
economic prosperity, and there is even
some evidence that countries that
attempt to maintain manufacturing
employment may do so at the expense of
economic prosperity. The effects of the
real exchange rate or local tax burdens
on the shift in employment from manu
facturing to the service sector are quite
small relative to the rate of advancement
of technological progress. Thus there
may be little gain, if any, in gearing pub
lic policy to offset these ancillary influ
ences on economic activity in manufac
turing. Perhaps state legislatures should
be concerned with how tax burdens and
other economic factors influence the
local business climate in the new ser
vice-oriented national economy.
■

Footnotes

1. The Tax Foundation’s Web page is
www.taxfoundation.org.
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